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Abstract
The idea of homesteading can be extended to the realm of biological entities, to 
the ownership of information wherein organisms perform artifactual functions as 
a result of human development. Can the information of biological entities be 
ethically “homesteaded”: should humans (or businesses) have ownership rights 
over this information from the basis of mere development and possession, as in 
Locke’s theory of private property? I offer three non-consequentialist arguments 
against such homesteading: the information makeup of biological entities is not 
commonly owned, and thus is not available for homesteading; the value of the 
individual biological entity extends to the information whereby it is constituted,
and includes inalienable rights of an entity over itself and its information; and use 
of life as an information artifact makes an organism an unending means to an end 
rather than an end itself. I conclude that the information space of biological 
entities is not open for homesteading, not liable to private ownership, and should 
not be available for perpetual exploitation.
Keywords: Bioethics, information ownership, private property, non-
consequentialist, biological information
Introduction
Property rights seem to imply that if I own a whole thing, I also own 
its parts, granted that those parts can be owned. If a whole is constituted by 
its parts, it would be constituted by all and each of its parts for at least as 
long as these are parts of the whole. For example, if I own my whole house, 
I own the exterior siding; if I own my whole car, I own the tires; if I own a 
whole book, I own all the words. But I do not own the informational content 
of the words in the book: the publisher owns this. I do not own the tire tread 
technology: the tire company exercises intellectual property rights. I do not 
own the formula for the composite exterior siding: a business owns this 
information, a part of the whole thing that I own—this part is not owned by 
me. Each of these wholes is an inorganic human artifact—what if we change 
the focus to living organisms? If I own the yard in front of my house, I also 
seem to have property rights over a blade of grass in the yard; if I own the 
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blade of grass, I must also own the biological information in that blade of 
grass. But that blade of grass is perhaps part of a genetically modified 
organism: the grass seed company that created this information owns it, and 
thus owns that kind of grass, even if the whole plant can be said to be a part 
of my property. I subsequently cannot legally sell the grass seed when the 
organism tries to reproduce itself, even though it is my grass.
The previous examples focus on information that is said to be owned 
privately and exclusively outside of material property rights (I own the 
material, someone else owns the information; for instance, I own the 
building, and someone else owns the rights to the blueprints). But is the last 
example of the same kind as those preceding it, with the exception that this 
latter information happens to be part of what makes up a biological entity? 
Do intellectual property rights hold for the information makeup of living 
things? One current trend in the West is to say: “Yes, you can own this 
information”; biotech, a $43 billion a year industry, is by-and-large built on 
exclusive patent rights to just this kind of biological information (Roberts, 
2018, 1108).1 Can the information of biological entities be “homesteaded”,
that is, do humans (or businesses) have ownership rights over biological 
information on the basis of mere development and possession, following 
Locke’s theory of private property? This is a global problem with political
and social ramifications (Powledge, 2001; Roberts, 2018), and how we 
answer it may affect not only the future of food, but the future of life on this 
planet (Shrader-Frechette, 2005). While most arguments in information 
ethics tend to be consequentialist in outlook (Fallis, 2004; Spinello, 2004; 
Macilwain, 2013; Roberts, 2018), judging or justifying information policies 
based on their effects, real or possible, I offer three non-consequentialist 
arguments against the homesteading of biological information: first, the 
information makeup of biological entities is not commonly owned, and thus 
is not available for homesteading. Second, the value of an individual 
biological entity extends to the information whereby it is constituted. Third, 
use of life as an information artifact makes an organism a means to an end 
rather than an end itself.  
1 The U.S. Constitution (1.8.8) gives Congress power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”; such patenting for 
exclusive rights to inventions and creations has been extended to organisms and their 
information over the years.
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Homesteading the Noosphere
In the present argument I discuss the ethics of “homesteading the 
noosphere”, a phrase coined by information technologist Eric Raymond
(2000) in an essay of the same name in which he provides an account of the 
ethics of information development in open source contexts, defining the 
noosphere as the “territory of ideas, the space of all possible thoughts” (9). 
Raymond (2000) suggests—based on Locke’s (1952) theory of property—
three ways of acquiring ownership of information entities: homesteading 
(common ownership plus work equals private ownership), transfer of title, 
and loss or abandonment of title and possession through a kind of pseudo-
homesteading. Homesteading is made the act whereby common ownership 
of the total information space (referred to here as the noosphere) is 
transformed into private ownership of the part of the information space 
developed by those who perform the knowledge work—free intellectual 
space is claimed for personal ownership through the act of development.2
The term “homesteading”, with reference to biological information, may be 
appropriate given key similarities between land and biological information 
(Roberts, 2018). Biological information, for example, is unique to an entity, 
as land is unique,3 and both may be inherited, giving each potential familial 
and hereditary links with the past and future (Roberts, 2018, 1169-1170). 
The idea of homesteading may thus extend to the realm of biological 
entities, to the ownership of information that helps organisms perform 
artifactual functions as a result of human development, such as through 
breeding practices or advanced genetic manipulation.4 Plants, animals, and 
human biological materials are made to take on traits and characteristics 
considered beneficial (to engineers) as a result of knowledge work, and this 
is said to result in the private ownership of the new biological information. 
But can the information of biological entities be homesteaded: do humans 
(or businesses) have ownership rights over this information from the basis 
of mere development and possession?  
Information is an intangible; Adam Moore has argued that the 
ownership of information counts as intangible property rights (2000, 98-99; 
1998; 1997). Moore clarifies his position by stating that “intangible 
2 For a more complete and nuanced account of the steps in this process, see Moore 
(2000).
3 Even identical twins do not share identical genetic profiles (Roberts, 2018, 1169).
4 The present paper does not address the ethicality of genetic engineering directly, but 
only the ownership of biological information. For treatments of the ethics of genetic 
engineering, see West (2006), Lucassen (1996), Hettinger (1995), Polambi (2013), 
Shrader-Frechette (2005), and Ormandy, Dale, and Griffen (2011).  
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property rights surround control of physical tokens, and this control protects 
rights to types or abstract ideas” (2000, 99), that is, it protects rights over
the ideas behind those individual tokens. Ownership of these abstract ideas, 
or “intellectual objects”, in the words of Hettinger (1989, 35), is often 
justified by entitlement to the fruits of one’s labor. As Hettinger points out, 
however, the right to own and use intellectual objects based on one’s own 
labor is distinct from the right to prevent others from also possessing and 
using the intellectual object or creating tokens of it for their own use: the 
right to possess and personally use one’s own property is distinct from the 
right to exclude others from benefiting from it (40). Additionally, Hettinger 
(1995) argues that while labor may extend the rights of a person to 
ownership of a token (personal use and possession of a specific thing), it 
does not extend the rights of a person to ownership of a kind (exclusion of 
others from possessing or using that kind or other tokens of that kind) (280). 
Ownership of an apple by laboring for it does not extend to owning not only 
all apples but the kind “apple” as a result of that same labor. 
It seems that Locke’s formula for homesteading does not cover or 
justify the exclusive ownership of biological entities as a kind through labor, 
nor of their biological information. Hettinger concludes that “it is prima 
facie irrational for a society to grant monopoly rights to something that all 
could use at once” (1995, 279).  
Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, argues that after 
common property becomes private property through labor, there must be no 
substantive loss to the common property, and no loss to others as a result of 
the acquisition, or in Locke’s own words, there must remain what is 
“enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Ch. 5, section 27).5 This 
seems to entail a limit to homesteading: homesteading must not detract from 
the rights of others or the common property of all. If intellectual objects are 
obtained as private property through homesteading, this process must not 
exclude others from the good of the commons, nor should it harm the 
commons itself. If the commons is the space of all possible thoughts, as in 
the noosphere, and privatizing a portion of the commons detracts from the 
total of all possible thoughts or excludes others from enjoying it, Locke’s 
theory regarding privatization through labor is no longer applicable as a 
justification for such privately owned intellectual objects, that is, these 
5 For Locke, this responsibility of the owner is not an indefinite state of affairs, but is 
concluded at the privatization of the common property: there must be enough and as good 
left over at the moment after the property becomes private.  
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intellectual objects may no longer be acquired through such homesteading.
Locke’s theory of property, then, is misapplied to the cases of homesteading 
biological information: such ownership detracts from the biological 
information available (some of the possible ideas are no longer available 
because they are owned), or it excludes others from enjoying it (biological 
information ownership claims are usually exclusive). It is not the noosphere,
the territory of all thoughts, that can be homesteaded with biological 
information, if we are to follow Locke’s limits, but instead the actual 
biological information tokens, so long as such privatization does no harm 
to either the commons of biological information, or every other human’s 
enjoyment of that commons. Physical tokens that instantiate intellectual 
objects might be ownable, but intellectual objects themselves might or 
might not be able to be owned through homesteading because ownership of 
intellectual objects might substantively detract from the commons of the 
noosphere or other’s enjoyment of it, and thus break Locke’s limits for
homesteading.  
There is No Common Ownership of Biological Information 
For biological information to be privately owned through 
homesteading, the information must be commonly owned. Common 
ownership requires common access or the ability for common use, but 
biological information is not accessible by all (we address here the 
information of a biological entity, not the biological entity itself), nor is it 
available for common use or appropriation, even if the material itself is. In 
an analysis of the possibility of the common ownership of biological 
information, we must be clear about the nature of common ownership, we 
must have some notion of information—and biological information in 
particular—and we must recognize problems related to the process of 
homesteading in this natural information space. 
The nature of common ownership includes subtractability and non-
excludability (Hess & Ostrom, 2006, 9). Commonly owned resources may 
or may not be subtractable (that is, there may or may not be limited 
resources or rivals for those resources), but they are necessarily non-
excludable. First, let us address subtractability: One person’s knowledge or 
use of a bit of naturally occurring biological information is not subtractive 
from the whole information space available, that is, such knowledge or use 
does not “use up” the resource so that others are barred from knowing or 
using the information. Because of this, naturally occurring biological
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information resources are non-rivalrous:6 there is no natural competition for 
limited biological information. But these information resources are 
excludable, that is, some people may be excluded from accessing or using 
the resources by their very nature, and this reintroduces the problem of 
rivalry and subtractability. We might ask: what naturally excludes people 
from biological information? The information is hard to come by and 
requires advanced and expensive technologies, skills and knowledge, and
the information itself is complex and therefore difficult to understand or to 
synthesize. Because of this exclusivity and the costs involved in access and 
use of the information, people become rivals for access and use (as long as 
there are perceived benefits). While the resources do not dwindle with use 
(as in traditional subtractability), the value of having the resource (the 
already known information) dwindles with greater access and use and
makes the limited amount of previously unknown biological information 
more valuable. New (unknown) naturally occurring biological information 
grows in value as it becomes more limited.
In our analysis of exclusion, it would be well also to address 
definitions of terms related to information. Following Machlup (1983, 641),
we take data to be “raw bits” (atomic facts) of what is given in the world,
information is “organized data in context”, and knowledge is the 
“assimilation of the information and understanding of how to use it” (Hess 
& Ostrom, 2006, 8). Information in biological entities exists as data,
becomes information for humans through scientific inquiry and analysis, 
and becomes knowledge for humans when it is understood and assimilated 
with other knowledge. Unfortunately, most humans have no access to the 
raw information in biological organisms; if they had access, most humans 
would not understand it because they lack the prerequisite scientific 
education and training; if they understood the information, most humans 
would not have the wherewithal to make use of it. In sum, most humans 
have insufficient access to biological data, insufficient understanding of 
biological information, and insufficient abilities to use or assimilate the 
biological knowledge. A remedy to this problem would be to provide free
public access to all natural biological data, training and education regarding 
biological information, and adequate resources by which to access and use 
the information. Without this remedy, the barriers to access, understanding,
6 Non-rivalry is a general characteristic of intangible works of all varieties (Moore, 2000, 
99; Roberts, 2018, 1168).
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and use of biological information make this information exclusive:
biological information is not commonly owned.  
Although raw biological information is not common property, it is 
not to be considered private any more than the moon (which is also not 
common property). Rather, it seems to be a resource enjoyed by few, and 
owned by none, rather than being owned by all. Common ownership 
requires common access or the ability for common use, both of which are 
not satisfied with biological information. If private ownership requires 
common ownership as its basis (as in homesteading), there can be no 
rightful private ownership except with previous common ownership. Note 
that this does not bar common ownership of biological information in the 
future, but it does bar private ownership through homesteading until and 
unless there is first common ownership, which would include open access, 
understanding and use. Practically speaking, this would mean that before 
homesteading could occur with specific biological information, that same 
information would be required to be openly accessible, understood and 
used. 
But let us suppose that at some time in the future such open access, 
understanding and use, either in part or in whole, is enjoyed by the public: 
would this constitute common ownership of biological information?
Common ownership can only occur if ownership is possible. Is it possible 
to own natural information states? Natural information states are forms of 
naturally occurring organization, and not merely the bits or data of which 
they are composed. To own such a state, a person would own a natural kind, 
that is, a kind of organization of information that occurs naturally.  
Let us take the example of a forest: many people, as groups or as 
individuals, are said to own forests and the trees that grow in them. In this 
case, notice that it is the particular forest (or the land) or the biological 
entities in it that are commonly or privately owned or that are public goods, 
rather than the kinds of things they are, for instance, a forest, flower or tree. 
While a forest may be ownable, forest is not, nor is flower or tree. As natural 
kinds, or forms, or information states, they can neither be commonly nor 
privately owned. This is, in part, because natural information states cannot 
be owned. If this is true, then natural biological information cannot be 
owned, even commonly. If private ownership requires common ownership 
plus homesteading, then naturally occurring biological information cannot
be privately owned.7
7 This may seem at first to be a misdirected defense—who would think that humans could 
own and exercise exclusive rights over naturally occurring biological information? In the 
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If natural information states cannot be owned, can artificial 
biological information states (biological information developed or 
synthesized by humans) be owned? Using our previously defined terms, can 
the noosphere of biological information be homesteaded, that is, can the 
space of all possible biological information states (non-actual or un-dreamt 
of) be developed from a commons for personal or corporate ownership? Of 
what would this commons—this noosphere—be composed: actual 
biological information or as-yet-unthought-of ideas, or both? If composed 
of actual biological information (naturally occurring), this cannot be owned 
even commonly, as was concluded earlier, and therefore cannot be part of 
the noosphere that is open to homesteading. If, as Eric Raymond argues, 
this noosphere is “the space of all possible thoughts” (2000, 9), the 
“commonly owned” property may not be actual; but we cannot own what is 
only possible unless we can exercise ownership over it. For instance, we 
can sell something we might own in the future before it exists (for instance, 
we might sell a house for which we have not yet completed the purchase 
process, or we might sell a right to inheritance we have not yet come into 
for a bowl of stew), but we may only do this if we have the right to sell it. 
If the noosphere was commonly owned, the public would be able to exercise 
ownership over it; they would be able to access it, use it, understand it, etc. 
But the public is not able to exercise ownership over it, so that it seems false 
that the noosphere (that is, every possible idea we have not yet had) is 
commonly owned. If the noosphere is not common property, it cannot be 
homesteaded, and thus cannot be privatized in that way.  
United States, until the Supreme Court decision in 2013 American Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics which overturned 30 years of patenting practice and precedents
(Palombi, 2013), it was the case that “genes and other DNA can be patented, whether
natural, recombinant, or synthetic…. One can also patent specific uses of any biological 
agent, whether the agent is novel or preexisting” (Hettinger, 1995, 277). The recent 
Supreme Court decision ruled that isolated natural biological materials are not patentable.
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The Value of a Living Thing Extends to Its Biological Information 
Another approach to this issue focuses on value: the value of the 
individual biological entity extends to the information whereby it is 
constituted. A biological entity has natural rights not only to its own 
material states, but also to its internal informational states; these rights are 
inalienable, as they are intrinsic to its value.8 The ownership of living things 
is fundamentally different than the ownership of non-living, in that living 
things continue to exercise natural rights over their own material and 
informational states separate and distinct from the rights of their external 
owners. The information of a biological entity cannot be homesteaded 
because the entity (and perhaps its kind) already exercises natural rights
over this content,9 and external ownership does not extend to ownership of 
this information. A seed can be owned, but not its information.  
What is it that makes a specific living organism valuable? The 
extrinsic value of living things is typically in view when assessing the 
development, use and ownership of biological information, that is, we look 
at what organisms and their information can do for us (West, 2006). But it 
is the intrinsic value of the information that makes it extrinsically valuable: 
living organisms carry out specific functions which are beneficial to 
themselves by means of biological information, and these functions are 
well-ordered unities, complex workings of the life of the thing. Part of the 
intrinsic value of the biological information is that it goes into making up 
the disposition by which the entity acts and performs changes in the world 
through time, that is, by living. If life is valuable, that by which life is carried 
forth in the world is valuable (at least for that entity), and this is a value not 
only intrinsic to the entity (it is part of what makes the entity itself valuable)
8 A significant number of people believe they own their personal biological information, 
including our past President Barack Obama (Roberts, 2018, 1150). Legally, five states 
(Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana) recognize personal ownership over 
one’s own genetic information (Roberts, 2018, 1128). “Casting DNA as the source of our 
individuality supports the proposition that genetic information might rightfully—perhaps 
exclusively—belong to the person from whom it came” (1150), that is, perhaps one 
reason for the general intuition that we own our own biological information is that this 
information is a part of our very selves.  
9 The biocentrism argued for here finds precedents in Indian ahimsa (non-violence to all 
life forms) found in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism; Albert Schweitzer’s arguments 
surrounding reverence for all life; Hettinger’s (1995) arguments concerning the natural 
ownership rights of all living things over their bodies and their futures, as well as the 
rights to non-harm (280-282); and the arguments from recent environmental ethics (Oritz, 
2004; Rollin, 2003; Verhoog, 1992) and progressive property (Roberts, 2018). 
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but is a value also intrinsic to the information (the information itself is a
well-ordered organic unity that is complex).
How is this value related to the natural rights of an entity? Whether 
an entity’s biological information is beneficial, neutral, or harmful to other 
entities (through knowledge and use or through natural functioning), the 
information is of value to the entity itself for the entity itself. Because the 
value of the information makes up part of the value of the entity as a part of 
its natural physical whole, it can properly (and naturally) be said that the 
biological entity exercises rights over its information as exercising rights 
over itself (because its information is part of itself, part of what makes it 
itself, and is not merely part of the things it owns).10 The entity does not 
come by its biological information artificially but naturally—it exercises 
natural rights because the information is natural to itself.11 This is unlike the 
case of a book and its words: the book may or may not exercise rights over 
the words of which it is composed; this is closer to the case of a person and 
their own thoughts: one’s thoughts are part of what makes a person that 
person, as with the book and its words, but additionally the person has some 
sense of responsibility for the thoughts, some agency, some causality, some 
inalienable rights over these thoughts.12 But even closer is the case of a 
person and their own genetics: the person has a natural right to this genetic 
information, not because this information is hers or his but because it is her 
or him, part of who the person is, not merely property. As a small subset of 
biological entities and their information, humans exercise natural rights 
over their own genetics (though not necessarily ownership rights), not 
because they caused this information or even because they know about it, 
but because it is part of who they are as a specific human; it is part of how 
they participate in human being. These rights are not mere ownership rights, 
but are personal rights, and more fundamentally, they are rights of an entity 
to itself. These rights are not specific to humans: every living thing has a 
right to itself and a right to its biological information as part of how the 
thing participates in its specific kind of being by living. However, as Jessica 
10 See McLochlin (2001) and Roberts (2018, 1150-1153) for a further discussion of this 
point.
11 Moore (2000, 107) suggests that “ownership of a token does not entail ownership of a 
type” in reference to owning one’s own genetic information.  
12 Lysander Spooner comments: “Nothing is, by its own essence and nature, more 
perfectly susceptible of exclusive appropriation, than a thought. It originates in the mind 
of a single individual. It can leave his mind only in obedience to his will. It dies with him, 
if he so elect” (1855; qtd. in Moore, 2000, 115).
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Roberts argues, even though biological information raises identity concerns, 
“one need not adopt the position that genetic information is determinative 
of identity to adopt the position that it is relevant to identity” (2018, 1158).13
Ownership of such information may be tantamount to commodification of 
an entity’s body or self, as being a commodification of part of the body or 
self (1154). 
This argument, by itself, does not conclude that the rights of a 
biological entity over its material and informational self may not in turn be 
under the rights of some other entity or group of entities, or responsible in 
some way to them or to its own kind, or part of a larger organic whole, but 
it does include the idea of inalienability: there are rights that cannot be taken 
away from a biological entity, and these include the rights to itself and to 
the information of which the thing is composed (Roberts, 2018, 1168). The 
private ownership of a living thing’s biological information through 
homesteading would trespass against this right of the living thing over itself,
sacrificing the rights of the entity to the rights of the owner, imposing an 
agency other than that of the entity to make the entity something it was not, 
without regard to these previous rights. This would be akin to owning the 
votes of a democratic country, or owning the constitutional rights of 
citizens, or owning the galloping of a horse, or owning the blossoming of a 
flower. While humans may have rights that counteract or are over the rights 
of other entities (for instance, the right to cut my grass), and material 
ownership rights over these same entities (for instance, I may be said to own 
my grass), humans do not have direct and absolute ownership of the rights 
of an entity over that entity’s own being or functioning (we do not own the 
grass’s right to grow or to be green—these are inalienable to the grass 
because they are part of what makes it itself).
It may be wondered whether humans overstep these rights every 
time we kill or eat a living organism. In those cases, the organism has a 
natural right to live and grow, and our killing and eating impinges on that 
right, but does not take it away—we do not own the life of the organism that 
we eat, and we do not alienate it from its right to live, or from its right to its 
own information. We take its life, not its right to life (which is inalienable). 
This right to itself is not a property right, which is the focus of this paper, 
but is instead a right to be what it is, informationally speaking (and 
13 While Roberts’ focus here is specifically about genetic information, the argument
seems to fit the case of all biological information, which is part of what makes biological 
entities themselves (that is, there are identity concerns, even though biological 
information might not be wholly “determinative” of an entity’s identity as itself).
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otherwise). But is killing and eating not still wrong? There might be several 
justifications for killing or eating living organisms even in view of such 
inalienable rights. One approach is that there might be a value ordering such 
that one entity’s life (or information) is justifiably taken to support the life 
of another even if its rights are inalienable. One might wonder what these 
values are, and how we might order them or might come to know the proper 
order. It might be that rational animals are of a different order of value, 
complexity, and being (as the intuitions of some show) such that use of non-
rational animals or vegetative life in this way is permissible or even good if 
it promotes the unity and complexity of the entire biosphere, if it promotes 
the well-being of rational animals, and if it promotes the well-being of the 
entity or kind of entity so used (and this could be justification for lower 
order beings eating and killing other biological entities as well). Wheat 
might be an example of an entity whose well-being as a kind might possibly 
be promoted through eating, if this were also accompanied by care of the 
kind out of interest for its welfare even if also motivated by self-interest. 
Apples are another example, as it seems that part of the purpose of fruiting 
is for the fruit to be eaten in order to propagate the seed. Overpopulated 
wildlife or cattle might be additional examples; human decomposition 
might be another. An alternative (or additional) justification for killing and 
eating is that the purpose of some entities might actually be to serve the life 
of others by being what they are and living and dying (and perhaps even 
being eaten) as they are—the purpose of the being might include its being 
in relation to other entities and their lives. This would include rational 
animals as part of the cycle of life, as we might be purposed to eventually 
provide food and life to other creatures (such as worms or bacteria). A third 
justification might be that there is a creator who commands, allows, or 
creates biological entities to kill or eat other organisms. This reason would 
be in keeping with the common beliefs of most humans throughout history, 
including adherents to many world religions. In this case, the rights and 
value of entities, kinds, and information would trace back to the design of 
the creator(s), and the purpose of the entities, kinds, and their information 
would come about as the result of the actions of this same being  
While the human right to require consent and compensation for use 
of one’s own biological information is generally acknowledged even 
outside of ownership (Roberts, 2018, 1147), plants and animals cannot so 
consent or choose compensation, nor may they freely enter into contractual 
agreements—to commodify a plant or animal’s biological information 
would be to do so without regard for its right to itself and its information,
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and would constitute exploitation, as I discuss in the next section. How 
could we “own” biological information without overlooking this silent 
value, this quiet right? 
Ownership of the Means of Biological Entities is Perpetual Exploitation
A third approach to the problem of homesteading biological 
information focuses on exploitation: use of life as an information artifact 
makes an organism a means to an end rather than an end itself. The heart of 
this argument is that lives are not mere tools; biological entities are not 
technologies. The engineered functions of a living thing should always 
serve to benefit the thing itself, and not harm it or limit its proper biological 
functioning. Ownership of biological information tends to place greater 
value on the intents and goals of the engineer or owner and replaces benefits 
to the entity with benefits to the owner, sometimes to the detriment of the 
entity. For instance, organisms have been genetically modified to disallow 
reproduction based on the supposed ownership rights of engineers. This 
design choice made on the basis of private ownership is to the detriment of 
the entity itself: the entity has been deprived of the right of being a viable 
species, of carrying on the natural functions for which it exists.14 Even when 
this does not occur, to own the information of an organism that passes on 
their new information would be to own rights to that kind in perpetuity: it 
is not like owning an apple, but rather more like creating an apple from a 
pear, and then owning all apples now and for the coming decades, to the 
point of owning “apple”. Such ownership would amount to perpetual 
exploitation of a kind, even if ownership of the patent only lasts for twenty 
years—the kind itself is a result of exploitation, and all future instances bear 
the mark of this exploitation in the very information of which they are
composed. Ownership of the means by which a biological entity is itself— 
14 As another instance of purposeful harm, Harvard received U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 
for “any transgenic nonhuman mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain 
a recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor 
of said mammal, at an embryonic stage”; Harvard supposedly owns any nonhuman 
mammals genetically modified in embryonic stage to increase the probability of getting 
cancer as well as all of the descendants of such an animal that are similarly at high risk 
because of this modification (https://patents.google.com/patent/US4736866A/en).
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that is, ownership of its functions through its information—is perpetual 
exploitation of the entity or kind through technologizing its own self or its 
kind.15
What if we isolate the material that contains the new biological 
information from its natural state, or synthetically create this new isolated 
material in a lab—can we own it then, without this counting as exploitation? 
This isolated biological information would still be information, which 
includes (in the very concept) organization as a kind. This would mean 
ownership of a natural or artificial kind that is biological in nature, an 
information state that is addressed above in earlier arguments.  
Conclusions on Homesteading Biological Information 
Jessica Roberts argues that “theory informs the most foundational 
question of property law: who should own what” (2018, 1108). It is not 
merely laws that are needed to protect the rights of entities, it is morality 
and a foundation for that morality, it is discussion and thought about natural 
rights, it is recognition and respect for the value of every living thing, it is
careful stewardship of resources that are much more than resources, that are 
alive, and that therefore exercise inalienable rights over their own 
information. Locke’s theory of property seems ill-fitted to the area of 
biological information: homesteading is a concept not appropriate to 
biological information. My argument here is that the information space of 
biological entities is not open for homesteading because it is never 
commonly owned and so is not liable to private ownership; biological 
entities have intrinsic value that extends to their biological information, and 
such information is relevant to their identities, and this provide bases for  
15 One might ask whether breeding is similarly exploitative. If the breeding is to such an 
extent that it harms the biological entity, such as through causing it pain, diseases, or 
sterility, it may in fact be just as exploitative, especially if these characteristics of the 
entity are not reversible in the kind, are unnatural, and/or result from goals of the breeder 
opposed to the well-being of the entity. Such instrumentalizing of life is not unique to 
modern technologies. 
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inalienable rights of the entity to itself; and biological entities deserve 
respect as ends in themselves, and should not be available for perpetual
exploitation.16
In sum, we do not own biological information; indeed, we cannot
own it. And because it cannot be owned, it cannot be commonly owned.
Because it cannot be commonly owned, it cannot be homesteaded. Because 
it cannot be homesteaded, it cannot be owned by me, or you, or any other 
thing. We cannot own the being of an organism, or the organization or 
functions of that being, that is, the biological information, and we ought to
stop acting as if we do. 
16 The approach I have outlined here responds only to explicitly Lockean property bases, 
and not to neoclassical approaches or progressive property, in both of which private 
property has different grounds than homesteading. In the economic neoclassical approach 
of Demsetz (1967), for instance, “property rights arise when it becomes economic for 
those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs” (347). People are rational 
decision-makers who seek to maximize utility through cost-benefit analysis (Roberts, 
2018, 1112). Private property only exists because it engenders more welfare than 
otherwise, welfare being the sum of all material wealth in a society (1113). Such
neoclassical property theory does not ground private property rights on homesteading, 
and thus is not directly open to my critiques on Locke’s system applied to biological 
information. However, among the two, neoclassical and progressive property, the latter 
seems more fitting to actual circumstances of biological information ownership (Roberts, 
2018), though even here, the second and third arguments offered above may continue to 
resist such concepts of ownership based on intrinsic value and perpetual exploitation of a 
kind.
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